The possible results of collisions between aircraft and birds are well knowndeath of human beings and birds, economic loss, and disruption of schedules. On Midway Atoll in the north-central Pacific Ocean, the problem is intensified by the presence of numbers of large birds breeding no more than three quarters of a mile from the runways on Midway' s Sand Island, by many heavily loaded military planes, and by the fact that the birds primarily concerned are Laysan Albatrosses (Diomedea immuta6ilis).
IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE CONTROL
More than 50 per cent of Sand Island' s surface is now paved or otherwise covered (figs. 1, 2) after being flattened (U.S. Navy, 1964). Perhaps no more than half of this can be attributed to the control program, but nonetheless albatrosses can no longer breed on most of their former colony grounds.
Removal of sand-holding vegetation and flattening of protective dunes has permitted blowing sand to invade the runways and the interior of the island, whereever the surface was not covered by pavement ( fig. 3) . However, the total number of deaths of breeding individuals of this long-lived, monogamous species does not give a complete picture of the effect on the reproductive potential of the colony. When one member of a pair is lost, the remaining member (male or female) does not nest the following year. At least this was usually true in our five-year study of marked birds, although Rice (1959) reported that 13 per cent of the bereaved mates do breed the next season. Thus even if only one member of a pair is slain, the reproductive potential of the remaining bird is usually destroyed for two years. ON THE INCIDENCE  OF  AIRPLANE-ALBATROSS  COLLISIONS   ASSEMBLING THE DATA   In table 1 is summarized all the available, pertinent information on the numbers of Laysan Albatrosses striking airplanes. Most of these data came from records kept by the Naval Station. However, the bird-strike data for 1956-1959, although also gathered by the Naval Station, were no longer in its files, and I Rice (1959) reported that an average of 9.8 per cent of the airplanes landing or taking off were struck by Laysan Albatrosses, but at the same time he indicated through other data that the average was 15 to 20 per cent too high. Therefore, I reduced by 1.5 per cent the average calculated after the inclusion of the three months for which he published no data.
EFFECT OF THE PROGRAM
Information for 1958-1959 and 1959-1960 is from the reports of Robbins (1960 Robbins ( , 1961 . For the period 1960 to 1965 the figures are my summaries of Naval Station records. Estimates of bird populations in these years are based on censuses that are reported in detail elsewhere (Fisher, 1966) .
The data on bird-airplane collisions in August, September, and October are excluded, for no Laysan Albatrosses are present then. However, 107 nocturnal collisions attributed to this species have been included, although almost certainly few albatrosses were involved.
Since the Laysan Albatrosses arrive in November, the "years" in the tables are really "breeding years"; this grouping, rather than the calendar years used in previous evaluations, is necessary if one is to make accurate comparisons between successive breeding populations which are often of quite different size.
In past analyses of these data, the simple, average percentage of airplane operations that hit birds was compared from year to year, or the percentages of strikes for a particular month in successive years were contrasted. Thus in table  1 The number of birds on the island in these years should have been reduced to the extent that the young birds not produced because of massive control from 1957 to 1959 did not enter the breeding grounds from March to May. Also, the elimination of at least 60,000 breeding birds from the areas regarded as troublesome should have had some effect, if those areas were really the primary ones causing the majority of the bird-plane collisions.
Perhaps it is not correct to use the breeding populations or the censuses of November-December-January to adjust the strike percentages throughout the year; at least the data are open to criticism because the strikes are more numerous in the spring and have been largely attributed to "unemployed birds" (Kenyon et al., 1958) .
But the censuses of November and early December are valid for use in adjusting the percentages of strikes to a common denominator for these months (table  3) We are hampered in the comparison of Actual and Expected Strikes in November and December by having estimates of breeding populations during the last of the egg-laying period for only four years (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) .
Censuses The fact that some adjustment in plane operations has occurred must also be considered; early-morning operations are now avoided when possible. This surely has lowered the strike percentage in recent years over and beyond any effect the control program may have produced.
Although it is impossible to judge the effects of weather on the number of strikes, and since the multiple facets of the population dynamics of the Laysan Albatross are yet to be unraveled, in my opinion this review of the results of the control program indicates that its effectiveness remains to be demonstrated, even after nine years.
ANALYSIS OF THE PREMISES UPON WHICH THE PROGRAM WAS BASED
The incidence of bird-airplane collisions may not be solely, and possibly not even primarily, a function of the number of birds within 100 or 750 or 1000 feet of the runways. Much of the total population of Laysan Albatrosses on Sand Island may be involved, without regard to the distance between the nesting sites and the runways.
To understand this we must first examine the geography of Midway Atoll and then re-evaluate the program of bird destruction and land leveling in the light of the flight habits of the albatrosses.
Many of the data used in developing the concept that birds near runways constituted the major hazard came from Kenyon et al. (1958) , and figures from three of their four counting stations (p. 27) included birds flying into and out of a triangle of breeding ground surrounded by paved runways (fig. 1A) . The birds had to cross runways or plane parkways or taxiways to move to and from the sea. Inclusion of these birds, it would seem, would bias the data for the island as a whole.
Sand Island is in the southtvest part of the atoll near the reef; deep water where the albatrosses feed begins less than 200 yards south of the island. To the north, deep water is five miles across the lagoon. The runways are on the south and west sides of the island. To move directly to the nearest deep water, the albatrosses must cross runways.
One may say that a distance of five miles means little to an albatross, and that it is fallacious to reason that they proceed immediately to the nearest deep water. To check this we made counts of the albatrosses that flew north across the lagoon to the sea and of those that took the shorter route to the south and west. Nine two-hour counts made when the wind was consistently from the southwest to west on successive days in the first week of December 1964, a time when 90 per cent of the birds on the island were breeders, showed 2133 moving off the island to the south, 1922 to the west, and 217 north across the lagoon. Thus at least on these occasions only 5 per cent of the birds went north, despite the fact that most of the breeding birds are now located in the northeast part of Sand Island.
Similar counts, made in mid-January 1965, when the wind was from the northeast and when "unemployed birds," as used by Kenyon et al. (1958) , constituted 30 per cent of the birds in our test plots, showed less than 10 per cent of the birds traveling north over the lagoon.
Evidence from Eastern Island supports the hypothesis that Laysan Albatrosses tend to depart toward the closest deep water and to return the same way. The bulk of breeding adults on Eastern move eastward and southward from the land, and the reefs are closest to these sides.
Immatures of all ages show the same tendency to move to the closest deep water. Two summers of daily censusing of marked nestlings that had left the nest sites and gone seaward showed that the majority moved to the beaches on these sides of Eastern Island.
Our recoveries in 1964-1965 of immatures, banded in 1961 and 1962 as nestlings in all areas of Eastern Island, indicated that many first landed on eastern and southern shores before moving to their natal areas. The main body of young birds banded on the western shore was caught in the southern part of the island, but few of the southern birds were captured on the west side. Young banded in the central triangle of Eastern Island were in later seasons often first found to the south and east and only seldom to the north or west. We frequently found these birds in the triangle a few hours later. The tentative conclusion is that the birds have "traditional avenues" of approach to the colonies, perhaps established during the juvenile trek to the shore.
Rafts of floating Laysan Albatrosses are frequently observed to the south of the reef and only infrequently to the north by persons on the recreational fishing boats and by the pilots of the ,sea-air rescue unit.
It is possible, of course, that the difference between my data relative to the source of birds that fly over the Sand Island runways and those of Robbins ( 1960) , who reported that two thirds of them come from within 750 feet of the runways, is the result of the elimination of that two thirds, leaving only the others to fly across. If this is true, the frequency of collisions should have been reduced. But this has not been demonstrated.
That the incidence of strikes is a function of the total population of albatrosses on Sand Island is well illustrated, I think, by the data of Robbins (1960) , who noted a 27 per cent decrease in birds flying over the runway. His estimate of populations was 30,000 to 39,000 (averaged in table 2), a decrease of from 35 to 50 per cent, and the incidence of strikes was 36 per cent less than expected. The gross similarity between the degree of these three reductions is significant.
Persons reporting on the control program have repeatedly referred to albatrosses "soaring" over runways. To most ornithologists soaring implies a circular pattern of flight, which in turn produces a vision of albatrosses wheeling back and forth across the runways. This is not the case at all, as Frings and Frings pointed out in 1959. I have never observed Laysan Albatrosses soaring in thermals generated by runways.
Albatrosses do not ordinarily employ flapping flight for more than seconds at a time and most often at the time of takeoff. Once airborne they progress in a zigzag manner, rising into the wind to gain altitude and moving obliquely across wind and losing altitude to gain speed for the next rise, occasionally flapping a few times. Most of the time the bird is below 100 feet of altitude at sea and on land where there are no obstructions such as trees.
Since the habit of flying albatrosses is to stay low to the ground and water, since the north side of Sand Island has an uneven covering of trees and buildings that produces difficult spots of turbulence without providing a continuous pathway of updrafts leading to the sea, and since the southern and western parts are now devoid of most obstructions to low flight or to an even flow of wind, it is suggested that more of the albatrosses now travel south or west, and cross the runways. In the past they may have flown north. Thus the extensive "terrain modification" undertaken in the southwestern part of Sand Island (fig. 1B) to relieve the problem actually may have increased the number of birds that fly across the runways to reach nests at more distant spots.
Most of the birds are hit as they are crossing the runways between the sea and their breeding areas. What has been the effect of the leveling of dunes, the removal of trees, and the widening of the flat spaces along the runway?
Intervening strips of vegetation or sand dunes deflect the wind upward to produce updrafts along which the birds glide; they seldom deviate more than 50 feet from the line of maximum lift which is to be found over the edge of the obstruction, the edge toward the wind. The turn to make the return trip along the updraft is fairly sharp, taking in no more than perhaps 50 feet; a longer loop takes the birds away from the area of the most effective rising currents and increases their labors.
Thus birds gliding on updrafts produced by trees or dunes alongside 300-footwide runways which have a truck road on either side seldom get over the runway and even less frequently are hit by airplanes in the middle of the 350-to 400-foot space. The presence of "updraft" paths alongside runways would probably decrease the number of birds using the airspace above the runways. The birds would follow the line of easier progression.
Further, when there are dunes and/or trees on either side of the runway, the winds are carried upward above the level of planes no more than 50 feet above the runway. This is, of course, no aid during ascent or descent of the plane above this level, but the layer of birds above 100 feet is thin and scattered. Planes are in this "strike zone" a very short time compared with the time they are moving below an altitude of 50 feet.
Removal of updraft-producing terrain on the windward side of the runway causes winds to move across at low levels. Widening of cleared areas causes more of the cross winds to drop onto the runway, or to pass across in an uninterrupted manner which produces better flying conditions for albatrosses over the runways.
Since albatrosses fly at low altitudes and are largely dependent upon winds, the direction and placing of air currents affect them greatly. Man should manipulate the currents as far as possible to produce avian flight patterns least dangerous to him and his airplanes. Ideally, the leveled width of a runway and its aprons should perhaps be just as narrow as is compatible with mechanical safety. Dunes, brush, and trees to produce updrafts should line the edges of the runway and should be of a height to throw the main wind currents above the level of planes still on the runway. Breaks in the lines of updrafts could be made to produce "bird crossings" where desired-where there would be the least danger to planes. Such control would not be 100 per cent effective. But it would, I think, be more efficient than the present program which causes all traversing albatrosses to fly over increasingly wider spaces at the altitude of airplane operations. If the strikes have been reduced in the past few years, which is not at all certain, it is my opinion that the decrease is primarily the result of the reduction in the population of birds and changes in airplane operations and not the result of the "terrain modification," which would, if anything, increase the opportunity for collisions. Frings and Frings apparently came to this same conclusion in 1959.
If terrain modification is the major factor as Aldrich (1961) and others state, why not modify the terrain without killing the birds? This could be easily accomplished in late August, September, or early October when the breeding grounds are free of both Laysan and Black-footed albatrosses. The evidence suggests that the birds would select other sites within a year or so.
GENERAL COMMENTS
There are other areas of misunderstanding of this problem, some based on lack of information, and some arising from the manner of gathering and publishing data (Aldrich, 1958 (Aldrich, , 1964 Brown, 1962) .
As long as major airplane operations continue the problem will be serious. But the situation has been somewhat exaggerated. There is no evidence that "40 per cent" of airplane operations ever did involve bird strikes. No plane has been wrecked, and only one to my knowledge was ever in actual danger of being wrecked.
No planes have been "out of service for months." Economic losses are not "in the millions" or even in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. In one lo-month period during one of the worst years, the reported loss was $83,000. The actual 10s was apparently less than $5000; the remainder was "depreciation" at $565 a day (Rice, 1959:22) . There is nothing wrong with such a system of accounting; expensive airplanes do depreciate, but publication of such large "costs" without explanation imparts an exaggerated impression of what a bird does to an airplane.
When a bird is struck during takeoff, safety demands that the damage be assessed immediately. Sometimes this means the takeoff is "aborted"; the plane never leaves the ground. At other times it is impossible to halt the takeoff run, and the plane circles Midway while the effects of the strike are being determined. If necessary, fuel is dumped and the plane lands-an expensive procedure. During the period from November 1960 to 1 January 1965, there were approximately 19,000 takeoffs. Only 58 of these resulted in either of the two procedures mentioned.
Airplanes which are not part of round-the-clock schedules and planes moving through Midway could operate when there was the least chance for collisions with birds. Passenger, freight, and strictly military flights from Honolulu could arrive and depart in darkness, rather than in the daytime. Many of the trans-Pacific military flights using Midway for refueling could do the same. The military could do more to help itself in these ways and thus decrease collisions appreciably.
The elimination in May 1965 of the Pacific Barrier, the Advanced Early Warning system of radar planes, one base of which was Midway, means that air traffic will be very much reduced. Remaining traffic can often be on a daily or seasonal schedule which takes into account the diurnal and seasonal activities of the albatrosses and the consequent varying incidence of bird strikes. Further, it seems likely that new technological advances in airplanes, communication, and detection have revealed that Midway is no longer an absolutely necessary part of our national defense in peacetime.
The Office of Naval Research (Contract 3479(00)) and the Graduate School of Southern Illinois University are supporting my studies of the Laysan Albatross.
Although my investigations are not primarily directed toward the problem discussed here, they do provide a broad base for understanding and evaluating the situation. I am grateful for the help being given.
